Volume 3, Issue 1, 2019

Kia Tae Pākoro: Lessons of CEAD 2018
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Editors: Robert E. Rinehart and Jacquie Kidd


To link to this volume https://doi.org/10.15663/tee.v3i1

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Kia Tae Pākoro: Lessons of CEAD 2018

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Abstract

When Camilo Catrillanca (24) died, he had one son and a pregnant wife. He was a weichafe (warrior) of the Mapuche, one of nine indigenous nations recognised in the Chilean Census. I learnt of Camilo’s life and death as a consequence of my attendance at the 2018 hui of Contemporary Ethnography Across the Disciplines (CEAD). I was able to learn about Camilo because I arrived at the hui laden with, aware of, and willing to share my own sorrow (tae pākoro).

This article stories the environment within which the CEAD hui 2018 was held. It discusses the history of settler colonialism in Chile, the problems of Via Chileña and the suffering of La Araucanía. The writing reflects my time as a manuhiri in Santiago. It recognises my autoethnographic method’s whakapapa as offspring to a tool of colonisation. Hence, it offers a different form of autoethnography, one that begins with the tangata whenua, the people of the earth.

Key words

Chile; Mapuche; Māori; indigenous; autoethnography

Introduction

The International Contemporary Ethnography Across the Disciplines Association (ACEAD) is a New Zealand-administered network of academics. The incorporated society is “dedicated to ethnography: its inquiry, scholarship, performance, and knowledge-making” (International Contemporary Ethnography Across the Disciplines Association 2014b, cl 3.0). Established in 2008, it holds biannual conferences in the Southern Hemisphere known as ‘CEAD hui’. The 2018 event was held from 21–23 November at Santiago, Chile.

This article stories the environment within which the CEAD hui 2018 was held. It discusses the history of settler colonialism in Chile, the problems of Via Chileña and the suffering of La Araucanía. It reflects my time as a manuhiri in Santiago. It recognises my autoethnographic method’s whakapapa (genealogy) as offspring to a tool of colonisation. Hence, it offers a different form of autoethnography, one that begins with the tangata whenua, the people of the earth.

1 From manu (bird) and hiri (laborious; long for).
Remembering Camilo: Part one

When Camilo Catrillanca (24) died, he had one son and a pregnant wife. He was Mapuche (people of the earth), one of the indigenous nations of Chile. A ceremonial dancer and speaker of his ancestors’ tongue, Mapudungun, Camilo lived in La Araucanía, a region almost 900 kilometres south from the capital of Santiago.

I never met Camilo nor visited La Araucanía, but felt them call months, perhaps years, before my arrival. At a conference in 2016, I met a woman of Wurundjeri (Melbourne area). She told me that, up until the 1980s, Māori would find her people to make acknowledgements and receive welcome to country. Then it stopped. Patterns of movement change, but the tikanga (life-sustaining customs and practices by which we and the world may know one another) still seems ethical and sensible to me.

On 9 August 2018, I posted to the CEAD hui Facebook page:

Good day Colleagues,

I am seeking your advice. I will be arriving early into Santiago and wish to acknowledge the indigenous peoples of the area (or, at least, avoid places that they would prefer I did not visit). The Santiago Metropolitan Government provides official information on communities and sites that the state recognises. As is the case with most things government, the information has its limitations, but it has helped me understand some basic things. For example, I now know my accommodation is near an area marked as comunidades indígenas of the Aymara.

I have no verbal Spanish and do not wish to interfere with our colleagues who are busy organising the conference. However, is it appropriate to visit their office and give my first acknowledgements? Or is it better to make acknowledgements at the comunidades near where I will stay?

Many thanks in advance for your communal knowledge.

At the bottom, I left a link to the Santiago Metropolitan Government’s indigenous peoples’ webpage. Less than an hour later, after some Internet trawling with the aid of Google Translate, I added a comment:

I was intending to visit the ruka at Parque O’Higgins on 14 November, but that currently appears impossible (https://radiojgm.uchile.cl/machi-jorge-quilaqueo-estamos.../). If other attendees are arriving early and would like to join me, or simply would like to share a coffee, please feel free to leave a comment.

The word ‘ruka’ was my first connection to the Mapuche. My paternal grandfather is the last of a genealogical line called ‘Ruka’. I was raised upon and still hold responsibility for those lands. In Mapudungun, a ruka is “a traditional Mapuche hut made from wood and mud” (Coles 2001, para. 5). But when the word first found me, I did not know it referenced a structure of Chile’s largest indigenous nation. I just thought I had to find the ruka because it said ‘home’ to me.

A day later, one of the conference organisers replied to my post and recommended a contact. I began an email conversation with and was welcomed by that contact, a Mapuche sister (lamgen). She later taught me and brought me into Santiago’s indigenous community. It is an act I will one day reciprocate not as researcher, but as lamgen. As such, I recognise and share in her mourning.

That sharing is why I am able to offer a different form of autoethnography. In arriving laden with and aware of our own sorrow (tae pākoro), we can see it in others. It is the grieving for a beloved. It is the longing for home. It is the willingness to see, hear and do. As manuhiri and lamgen, I acknowledge my responsibility to the Mapuche as kaupapa tangata (layers of the land that act as intermediaries with humans), as those who tae pākoro. In thanks for their generosity, this writing is a contribution towards the “development of global indigenous strategic alliances” (Smith 1999, 108). Moreover, it is tika (correct; life-sustaining).
An unsettling

Chile, like New Zealand, collects indigenous data based on self-identification. In 2017, Chile’s population was 17,574,003 of which 2,185,792 (12.4 percent) identify as indigenous (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2018b). They are the peoples (“pueblo indígenas u originarios”) who descend from pre-Columbian collectives, maintain a distinctive philosophy, and for whom the land is foundational to their existence and culture (“para quienes la tierra es el fundamento principal de su existencia y cultura”) (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 2018b, 16). Nine peoples are recognised by statute and in the Census: Aymara, Colla, Diaguita, Kawésqar, Lican Anai, Mapuche, Quechua, Rapa Nui, and Yagán o Yámana. Additionally, 28,115 belong to peoples that are categorised as ‘other’ (for example, the peoples of Karukinka) and 67,874 state no name. The Mapuche is by far the largest people at 1,745,147.

Like the narratives of my own peoples, the Mapuche have stories marked by settler colonialism. The 1641 Treaty of Quillen (amongst others) confirmed Spanish recognition of Mapuche territorial authority and created a border between the two sovereign nations at the Bio Bio River. However, the late 1700s saw a shift in policy. There was the rise of scientific racism and the Spanish American wars of independence (Overfield 2011). The Chilean settler state’s the 1818 Declaration of Independence was recognised by Spain in 1844, and neighbouring Argentina became constitutionally independent in 1853. The resulting border artificially split the Mapuche nation in two (Minority Rights Group International 2018). Worse, Mapuche territories were invaded and annexed through force by the Chilean and Argentinian settler states from 1862 to 1885 (United Nations General Assembly 2017).

The campaign for the Pacification of the Araucanía Region ran from 1861 to 1883. Its intent was “to conquer usable land and was driven by an ideology that sought to eliminate indigenous groups by ‘civilizing’ them” (Museo Chileno de Arte Precolombino 2012, para. 1). The Pacification was successful in the dispossession of native lands from nonhumans and humans alike. Largely rural, the most populous city of La Araucanía is Temuco. The city is named for a swamp myrtle (Blepharocalyx cruckshanksii)—temu in Mapundungun—and its water (co). However, “swathes of Mapuche territory have been converted into large-scale commercial pine and eucalyptus plantations owned by forest and timber companies” (Moloney 2010, 449). Indeed, “in the last 50 years, monoculture pine and eucalyptus plantations have replaced the biodiversity of the original forests” (Youkee 2018, para. 6). Consequential to agriculture and logging, the temu is registered with the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) as near-threatened (González 1998).

The temu’s Mapuche caretakers were confined to approximately 3,000 reducciones (reservations) (Minority Rights Group International 2018; Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008). Those reservations were progressively expropriated until the people occupied around “five percent of their original territory” (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 4). Such acts did not destroy them. Patricio Guzmán Campos’ (2012, 75–91) photography from 1967 evidences a Mapuche community at Capitán Pastene (La Araucania) alive and well. By 2010, approximately 60 percent of Mapuche were urbanised (Moloney 2010), most in Temuco, Santiago, and Concepción (east of the Bio Bio estuary) (Minority Rights Group International 2018). Despite the physical distance, the Mapuche maintain their obligations to the land and nonhuman kin.

Like my own People, the Mapuche recognise and give respect to the interrelationship between all life forms. Armand Marileo Lefio is Ngenpin (“Ancestral Spiritual Authority”) for a community near Lake Budi in La Araucanía (Lefio, n.d.a, para. 1). The Ngenpin states that “the mapuche culture is intrinsically inimical to competition and power. It is premised on solidarity and reciprocity, and guided by a communal project of ‘preserving the earth and nature for all time’” (Lefio, n.d.b, para. 31). Hence, “the occupation and commercial exploitation of their land, with the adverse environmental consequences that go with intensive commercial land usage, is … viewed by sections of the Mapuche as an attack on their essential values and even on their very right to exist” (United Nations General Assembly 2014). From the early 1970s, Mapuche responses to this attack have included “land seizures, strikes, and protests” (Rodriguez and Carruthers 2008, 4). Unfortunately, the attack on Mapuche values would become just one of many made by agents of state organisations from 1973.
Wednesday 14 November

I had arrived in Santiago on 13 November a wee bit under-prepared. For example, I am not a cell phone person. My lack of cell awareness means I had no roaming (nor charging) plan. Hence, the walk to town relied on long-lost map-reading skills. I did not get too lost, but there was an unplanned stop outside Museo Chileno de Arte Precolombino, an institution for collecting artefacts from Chile’s indigenous peoples. At the Auckland Museum, as at Te Papa, some of the taonga (treasures) mumble. I moved along in case a tūpuna (ancestor) had left something for me to hear in Chile.

I was heading for Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes (the National Museum of Fine Arts). At 3pm, there was to be a walking tour that would teach me how to use the Metro, Santiago’s subterranean rail system. In the meantime, I wandered through an exhibition dedicated to the surrealist Roberto Matta. Born and raised in Chile, Matta emigrated from Paris to the United States in 1939 (then back to Europe in 1948). He denied (and was denied by) his homeland after the rise of a military regime (Kimmelman 2002). Nevertheless, the exhibition attempted to pin Matta to Chilean history (Museo Nacional Bellas Artes 2018). This hunger for national pride was on display throughout my weeks in Chile.

Via Chileña: Dictatorship and democracy

On 11 September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet commanded a coup d’etat that resulted in 17 years of authoritarian rule by a military junta. The Government Junta comprised of the heads of four-armed forces (air force, army, navy and police) who formed the dictatorship’s legislature and (until December 1974) executive. The ‘lucky’ (if such a thing exists) escaped. Political refugees found exile abroad, returning for the General’s 1988 plebiscite defeat and the establishment of a post-dictatorship administration (Wright and Zúñiga 2007). The unlucky did not. In all, 40,018 people are recognised as victims of the regime, suffering kidnapping, detention, torture, attempted assassination, forced disappearance and execution (BBC News 2011). At least 3,065 did not survive. One hundred and sixty-two Mapuche casualties are commemorated by Meli Che Mamüll, a memorial in the Temuco park of Isla Cautín (Ñuke Mapu 2018). Some of the dictatorship’s victims died (or ‘disappeared’) at the hands of the Chilean police (Human Rights Watch 2003; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1986).

Since 1927, Chile has operated a police force with military status, the Carabineros. The Carabineros is led by a General Director, one of the Junta four. The force exists to give effectiveness to the law, to guarantee public order and internal public security (“existen para dar eficacia al derecho, garantizar el orden público y la seguridad pública interior”) (La Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Chile2, art. 101). They are expected to be essentially obedient, non-deliberative, hierarchically-organised and disciplined professionals (“son esencialmente obedientes y no deliberantes … profesionales, jenerquizadas y disciplinadas”) (La Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Chile, art .101). They are organised so that they have “a presence in virtually every town, village, and hamlet of Chile” (Central Intelligence Agency 1987, 7).

The Carabineros’ power is pervasive. For example, the National Security Council was established under Chile’s Constitution of 1980. As consultative board to the President, the Council is arguably the country’s most powerful body. The four offices of the Junta are all voting members, alongside the President, Presidents of the Senate and Supreme Court, and Comptroller General. Like the other members, the Carabineros’ General Director has influence over the President in the exercise of his or her3 functions (La Constitucion Politica de la Republica de Chile, art. 106). The Council and this power continued subsequent to the return of democracy.

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3 Although there is awareness in Chile of nonbinary genders, two genders and traditional gender roles are normative. For example, all the symbols for women (mujeres) in Census 2017 have skirts (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 2018a). Given the norm, the use of binary possessives for the President reflects the oppression of nonbinary persons. No presidential candidate would consider their pronouns.
In 1989, Chile held its first elections for representative government since the Chilean presidential event of 1970. Patricio Aylwin became president on 11 March 1990. However, “considerable space [in the Constitution] is devoted to the doctrine of national security, controlled and interpreted by the armed forces, as the permanent guiding principle of national political life” (Central Intelligence Agency 1988, 9). Thus, the new Chilean democracy was a compromise led by the regime between opposition parties (Foxcroft 2017). Constitutional changes were required prior to the regime change.

These “pacted negotiations” for a smooth transition from the dictatorship (Foxcroft 2017, 73) were part of a “conspiracy of consensusb” (87). When seen alongside a history of oligarchies (Motyl 2000) and “inequality … a social ill stemming from colonialism” (Diaz 2010, para. 2), the conspiracy’s intentions become clear. They continue a longstanding tradition of *Via Chilena*, “the cycle of impunity, memory and governability employed by the political elites to ensure stability” (Foxcroft 2017, 58). It continues today. To illustrate: Andrés Chadwick was “a vocal supporter of Augusto Pinochet” whose regime “named him president of the Catholic University Students Federation” (Kozak 2018, para. 2). Chadwick and Hernán Larrain defended Colonia Dignidad, an enclave “established by the fugitive Nazi officer and paedophile Paul Shäfer” and later used “to torture and murder opponents of the regime” (Kozak 2018, para. 3). In 2018, Chadwick became the interior minister and Larrain the justice minister in President Sebastian Piñera’s second government. The powerful in Chile retain power.

The latest manifestation finds itself on the dictatorship’s laissez-faire economic liberalism. Indeed, the Constitution “emphasiz[es] the pre-eminence of the economic philosophy of [the] Pinochet regime, making clear that the state should play only a limited role in the economy” (Central Intelligence Agency 1988, 10). Sergio de Castro, a Pinochet finance minister and “the main architect of the neo-liberal revolution”, was one of the first Chileans to study under Milton Friedman at the Chicago School of Economics in 1956 (Silva 1996, 519). Consequently, the regime-initiated transfers to the private sector of economic rents through privatisation of state assets, sale of “high-yield copper reserves to transnational corporations without regard to underlying asset value”, and “virtual tax-free” grants to private sector mining (Cypher 2004, 529; see Silva 1996; Sigmund 2009). In opposition to public opinion (Cypher 2004), social spending (education, health and social security) slowed considerably for decades. This has had an effect on the Chilean population.

There is high income inequality. The gap is “more than 65% wider than the OECD average, with one of the highest ratios between the average income of the wealthiest 10% of its population and that of the poorest 10%” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2018b, para. 6). A rise in average per capita income of 105.3 percent between 1970 and 1998 can be noted (Cypher 2004). However, this did not filter to wages, which were only 29.5 percent greater. Some improvements have occurred subsequent. Between 2001 and 2017, the minimum annual salary rose from USD4,449.80 (~NZD6,562) to USD7,086.20 (~NZD10,450) (OECD, n.d.). Nonetheless, in 2006, many households were still sensitive to poverty line adjustments; “an increase of 25% in the poverty line cause[d] an increase of about 50% in the incidence of poverty” (Larraña, 2009, 10).

The common remedy is education, but there are barriers. In 2017, the average years of schooling for people aged five or older was 10.02 years (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 2018). Only the wealthy receive quality (Goldman 2012). In a 2015 four-level reading assessment for upper secondary students, almost all of the richest students achieved Level 2 (94 percent) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 2015). In contrast, just over half of the poorest learners achieved the same level (55 percent). Transition to higher education is wealth dependent. For example, 65 percent of the richest students (age 18–22) attended higher education in 2015. Comparatively, only 35 percent of the poorest did the same.

Lacking effective distribution of high-quality schooling, assertions of education’s transformative capacities become conjecture. In Chile, there is no evidence of education’s effect on movement within

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4 Pinochet ceased to be the country’s political leader in 1990 but remained military commander-in-chief until 1998 and subsequently received immunity from prosecution (Cvic 2000). Although final authority of a murderous regime, he died in 2006 (aged 91) having never been convicted of any criminal act.

5 United States dollars.

6 New Zealand dollars.
“a hierarchy of privilege” (social mobility) (Scott 2015, para. 1). Indeed, any Chilean social mobility appears “inconsequential, because it takes place among classes that share similar positions in the social hierarchy of resources and rewards” (Torche 2005, 422; see OECD 2018a). Nevertheless, the OECD (2018a, 2) proposes Chilean education reform “to ensure upward job mobility opportunities”. While half of the Chilean adult population have “low literacy skills” (OECD 2018b, para. 6) and equity policies continue to be “subject to state income as a share of GDP” (OECD 2018c, 63), any reform is unlikely “to alleviate the burden of unfavourable starting conditions in life” (OECD 2018a, 2).

Friday 16 November

On Friday afternoon, I followed my feet to the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos (Museum of Memory and Human Rights). The Museum is dedicated to publicising the “systematic human rights violations by the Chilean state between 1973 and 1990” for the purpose of “ethical reflection”, so that it may happen “Never Again” (Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos, n.d., para. 1). The grounds are large, occupying half a block. On foot, the entrance is from the southwest corner. The south courtyard is a tiled slope of light grey. On a long wall, the Spanish text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is formed in brass. The four floors of the main building are to the west and an auditorium to the east. A grey block (most likely offices) joins them, floating above the north courtyard. There, a large structure breaks the concrete with unvarnished wood. It is a ruka not yet ready for visitors. I stopped for a cup of tea at the café before heading into the main building.

The displays are frequently bilingual (Spanish and English), the foyer an introduction to genocides around the world. The first floor focuses on 11 September 1973. The second floor discusses the rise of democracy. The top floor hosts a temporary exhibit on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In the basement, there is an exhibit of one torture camp. A scale model centres the room while interviews with survivors play on the walls.

Alongside my grief, I felt empty edges to the narrative. What came before 11 September 1973? What happened between the coup d’etat and the 1988 plebiscite? International perspectives are limited to media and Central Intelligence Agency reports describing the regime and its democratic transition. Missing are the stories of the “silent diplomacy” that maintained the military dictatorship; the Reagan administration “went so far as to refine the US’ official diplomatic rhetoric, refusing to refer to the Pinochet regime as ‘totalitarian’ and instead dubbing it an ‘authoritarian’ regime” (Ortega 2010, 31).

There are many heroes in the tale and only one villain. But prevention of oppression requires social change not simply the absence of an individual personality. I think, for healing, it would be good to hear the voices of the military personnel and the ordinary people, those never imprisoned but constantly aware of the possibility. This was a situation that brought out the worst in some and suppressed the best in others.

Subsequent truth commissions, like the bodies that produced the 1991 Rettig and 2003 Valech Reports, did not allow wrongdoers and their witnesses an opportunity for change. Indeed, the Rettig Report provided a platform for the Chilean military to “vehemently reject” any recommendations (United States Institute of Peace 2003, para. 15). A similar argument could be made for our own Waitangi Tribunal where the Crown rejects sovereignty claims, attacks decades of hapū research, and ignores uncomfortable recommendations that are nonbinding anyway. There has to be an alternative.

La Araucanía

However, Law 19.253 “imposes a series of limitations on indigenous people’s property rights” (Pereyra-Uhrle 2006, 142). Moreover, matters of development, property, and “title cannot be treated in isolation from other issues such as poverty” (Pereyra-Uhrle 2006, 142).

La Araucanía is “home to the majority of the country’s Mapuche [and the region] is the poorest in the country, with nearly a quarter of its residents living below the poverty line” (Pullella and Charme 2018, para. 16). In 2017, the region’s population was 957,224 of which 34.3 percent identified as indigenous or native (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 2018). The proportion of indigenous people living in poverty or extreme poverty in La Araucanía was almost 41 percent in 1996. As lonko (leader) Juana Calfuano Pailleff describes, the situation had not improved by 2001:

We live in extreme poverty. We’ve got no electricity or running water. We have to draw water from the nearest river and we’ve been requesting electricity for the past 12 years, to no avail.

I live in a ruka … with only the earth for the floor. We live in rukas partly because that’s what we’re used to, but mainly because we haven’t got the money to build proper houses. (Coles 2001, para. 4–5)

In 2011, the proportion of Mapuche living in poverty or extreme poverty was still over 24 percent (Valenzuela, Toro, and Rojo-Mendoza 2016, 533).

This poverty is an example of how settler colonialism is “violently enacted through institutions’ structures, discourses, ideologies, and practices” (Kauanui 2017, para. 3). It is violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” (Galtung 1969, 168). Subject less, it is “built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969, 171).

Structural violence in La Araucanía is positive in that “elimination is an organising principal … rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence” (Wolfe 2006, 388). As J. Kēhaulani Kauanui (2016, para. 4) states, “The logic of elimination of the native is about the elimination of the native as native.” Relationships between land and its communities (such as native forest ecologies) are being destroyed and replaced (with, for example, monoculture plantations). Where indigenous communities have not been summarily liquidated, Unsettler society has attempted to replace connections to land with “biocultural assimilations” (Wolfe 2006, 388).

Thus, regional disparities in both relative income and multidimensional poverties are observed. Alongside income, La Araucanía is a region with the highest “deprivations in education, health, jobs and social security, housing, and network and social cohesion” (OECD 2018b, 29). Indigenous Araucanians are “certainly poorer” (Valenzuela, Toro, and Rojo-Mendoza 2016, 533) and, “while education helps indigenous sectors to increase their incomes, the evidence shows that these are not comparable with those earned by the non-indigenous group” (536). This structural violence is intended to maintain existing hierarchies (not support movement) and ensure the “power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed” (Galtung 1969, 171). As Edward Said (1989, 207) notes, the result of assimilation does not mean there are less categories to fill: “To be one of the colonized is potentially to be a great many different, but inferior, things.”

Structural violence operates in conjunction with personal, physical methods. Whilst Via Chileña contributes to the structuring of stable government and impoverishment, the Carabineros provide the “personal somatic violence” (Galtung 1969, 174) necessary to maintain social control. Carabineros violence has not been limited to indigenous people; “political opponents” (Central Intelligence Agency 1987, 11) and student movements (Goldman 2012) have also been targets. However, the Mapuche are victimised frequently enough to be an identifiable group.

La Araucanía has been a site of the police’s Grupo de Operaciones Policiales Especiales (GOPE) (TeleSUR 2018c, para. 2), a “small elite antiterrorist unit” established under the dictatorship (Central Intelligence Agency 1987, 11). Its effect has been lethal. Jamie Mendoza Collío died from being shot in the back by a GOPE officer in August 2009 (Cooperativa.cl 2010; El Mercurio Online 2009). He is one of the 16 Mapuche “murdered at the hands of state security forces since the return to democracy in
1990” (TeleSUR 2018f, para. 7). In June 2018, President Piñera announced “a special Carabineros force to fight more effectively the rural violence in the area of the so-called Mapuche conflict” (Santiago Times 2018c, para. 1). Nicknamed “Jungle Command” (TeleSUR 2018f, para. 1), the presence of this special section of the GOPE drew dissent. The “police unit … constitutes a permanent threat, violating [the Mapuche] right to live in peace, violating the rights of … [Mapuche] children, women and the elderly” (TeleSUR 2018b, para. 3).

Past experiences inform present realities. A 2004 report suggests that Mapuche “women, children, and old people often bear the brunt of the distress caused by the incursions of the police” (Human Rights Watch 2004, 43). In 2010, the UN heard specific examples of Mapuche children in La Araucanía being shot, and unarmed prisoners being beaten, by the Carabineros (United Nations General Assembly 2010). Following the December 2016 police shooting of a prostrate Brandon Hernández Huentecol (age 17), the UN received a request that the “Chilean State desist forthwith with all acts of torture and all cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment such as firing lead shot at members of the Mapuche communities” (United Nations General Assembly 2017, 4). Most horrifyingly, “documented cases of police brutality against Mapuches abound” (Witte-Lebhar 2012, 2).

When anatomical targeting (such as “piercing” with bullets) fails or is unavailable, physiological strategies (such as “denial of movement” via detention) can be applied (Galtung 1969, 174). The Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law 18.314) was introduced by the dictatorship in 1984 “with the clear purpose of severely penalizing any rebellion against the regime” (United Nations General Assembly 2014, 9). The statute grants procedural advantages to police investigators and prosecutors (for example, extended detention of suspects, correspondence intercepts, anonymous witnesses) and is “invariably used as an adjunct to a substantive criminal offence which can be prosecuted under ordinary criminal law” (United Nations General Assembly 2014, 13). Although Law 18.314 clearly “contradict[s] the principle of legality” (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in United Nations General Assembly 2014, 11), it is still in use today (Diario Constitucional 2018).

The statute is disproportionality applied against Mapuche activists. For example, “the Frei government [1994–2000] arrested 12 Mapuche activists and imprisoned them under the anti-terrorism law” (Rodrigues and Carruthers 2008, 10). The law is applied alongside others of internal security. Thus, the Lagos government (2000–2006) “processed hundreds of Mapuche activists under the provisions, and several Mapuche leaders remained in prison charged with terrorist activities” at term’s end (Rodrigues and Carruthers 2008, 15). Despite claims to a different direction (Rodrigues and Carruthers 2008), the second Bachelet administration (2014–2018) arrested four Mapuche in June 2016 and remanded them “on pre-trial detention orders issued under the anti-terrorism law” (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2017, para. 2). They were still detained awaiting trial when an appeal by two Special Rapporteurs was made against the law’s use in October 2017.

As Ministers of State continue to publicly identify Mapuche as “terrorists” (TeleSUR 2018e), it should not be surprising that execution of Law 18.314 includes “undue and excessive use of force against members of the Mapuche … [that] could have negative and discriminatory impacts on indigenous peoples that go beyond their impacts on the individuals suspected of having committed an offence” (United Nations General Assembly 2014, 16). This is settler colonialism. This is Chile.

**Remembering Camilo: Part two**

Camilo was a weichafe (warrior) of the autonomous Temucuicui community in the municipality of Ercilla (Mapuexpress, n.d.). His grandfather was the lonko and his father a leader. In 2011, at the age of 15, Camilo was spokesman for 30 students that occupied a local council building for two weeks. He denounced the racism and discrimination that affects adolescents in educational establishments, the police control that prevents them from moving freely in their communities, and the impossibility of appealing to a State that represses them (“el racismo y la discriminación que afecta a los y las adolescentes en los establecimientos educacionales, el control policial que les impide moverse libremente en sus comunidades y la imposibilidad de apelar a un Estado que los reprime”) (Mapuexpress, n.d., para. 2). In Santiago, a young Chilean woman spoke of the Mapuche as Those Who Have Never Been Defeated. A father of one with another on the way, Camilo continued that tradition.
On 14 November 2018, Camilo Catrillanca was assassinated, shot in the back of the head by the GOPE. He was no threat driving his tractor away with his 15-year-old nephew. After, the police violently assaulted Camilo’s nephew and posed the two in the media as outlaws. Politicians suggested Camilo was shot in self-defence (TeleSUR 2018a). Weeks of civil unrest ensued.

International media picked up the story. Police initially denied that body cameras were present but later admitted that a memory card and its evidence had been destroyed. Other videos of the incident were released (TeleSUR 2018g) and multiple resignations accepted: the Governor of La Araucanía, a police general and colonel. Piñera replaced the General Director of the Carabineros (Merco Press 2018). There were water cannons on university campuses and tear gas on the streets of Temuco and Santiago.

In late November, four officers were charged with homicide. Investigations began (TeleSUR 2018d) after reports that a police solicitor and officer-in-command ordered the officers to give false testimony (Santiago Times 2018b). More positively, the lower house of Chile’s bicameral legislature announced a special joint session to discuss “violence in La Araucanía and the murder of Camilo Catrillanca” (Santiago Times 2018a, para. 1).

On 8 December, Piñera ordered the withdrawal of the GOPE from La Araucanía. However, they are to be replaced with the Carabineros Special Forces unit. Piñera has “come to the conclusion that by strengthening and reinforcing the Special Forces of the area … [the Chilean state] can obtain better results in terms of security and give greater guarantees that the procedures used will always be the right ones” (TeleSUR 2018c, para. 8). Camilo is not the first Mapuche to die at the hands of the Chilean state. Evidence shows that he is not the last (Santiago Times 2019).

**Ethnography: In lieu of a conclusion**

‘Ethnography’ is a noun that denotes the product of a group of different methods. Data is collected in many different ways, including participant observation, interviews and archival analysis. Data can be analysed quantitatively, although a qualitative element is often present given the social emphasis.

A singular definition proves unavailable; like other words, ‘ethnography’ “vacillate[s] before various possibilities of meaning” (Said 1989, 212). Ensuing from Ellis, Adams, and Bochner’s (2011) conception of autoethnography, ethnography might be said to be the description and systematic analysis (graphy) of cultural experience (ethno). Applying the “reductively pragmatic response” (Said 1989, 211), ethnography could also be described as “the detailed study and analytical description of a defined social setting” (Elliot, et al. 2016; see also Brewer 2003). Following a more “aesthetic” definition (Said 1989, 211), ethnography might be seen as “a product of the interaction between the ethnographer and a social world … crafted through an ethnographic imagination” (Atkinson 2006, 402). In any case, ethnography is a method born of and honed in anthropology.

My first degree (1994–1997) included a major in the discipline. Mid-1990s New Zealand undergraduate anthropology offered little theory, but I still read about the crisis of representation, the writing of (Clifford and Marcus 1996) and against (Abu-Lughod 1991) culture. Before embarking on the doctoral project, I completed an additional postgraduate qualification to hone my autoethnographic practice. However, by 2015 the early debates (including those with a decolonial agenda [Escobar 1993]) had become passé. In order to maintain the right to represent the other, anthropology in New Zealand had dialectically developed a fieldwork focus with thick ethnographic description. The nails dug deep into relativism; there was little space for any ontological turns. Disciplining began early. We students were actively encouraged to describe ourselves as anthropologists, to look warily upon ethnographers untrained in ‘our’ discipline. Although I considered a doctoral enrolment and continue to engage with (and have friends who are) anthropologists, I never identified myself as a member. Maybe there was just too much (Unsettler colonial) history between us.

Anthropology was “historically constituted and constructed in its point of origin during an ethnographic encounter between a sovereign European observer and non-European native occupying … a lesser status and a distant place” (Said 1989, 211–12). Hence, physical anthropology founder Blumenbach’s typology for “European colonists” (Peregrine 2013, para. 3; see Richards 2003, para. 3). In Chile, there were the peoples of Karukinka (Tierra del Fuego) and Darwin’s “imperial suggestion in *Descent of
Man] that indigenous peoples are only slightly more discerning creatures than dogs” (Day 2008, 64). Dispersal into other disciplines has not divorced ethnography from its role as a tool of empire. The Master never laid it down.

ACEAD and I are similar, maintaining an oblique connection to anthropology. However, during the hui, I began to suspect the polite distance meant ACEAD’s claim to ethnography avoided the ethical implications of the method’s representation debate and colonial history. At the closing plenary, I implored the international participants to take home what they had learnt as visitors to Chile. I sung to them (and mucked up the middle verse), so felt confident enough to make my request. If they could not advocate, I asked that they at least talk about what they had seen.

Later, in conversation with fellow New Zealanders, I realised that what I had seen and heard, several had not. Lacking any Spanish, the conference attendees may have missed the media; I w

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